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The Burning of Falmouth, 1775
A Case Study in British Imperial
Pacification
by Donald A. Yerxa

As Britain’s colonial policy evolved from its emphasis
on coercive legislation to forceful suppression, the Minis
try increasingly turned to the Royal Navy as an instru
ment of implementation. In 1774 the government called
upon the North American Squadron, which had policed
colonial waters since 1763, to enforce the Boston Port
Act. When Anglo-American relations worsened early in
1775, the Navy was charged with the additional task of
blockading colonial trade with foreign nations. And
when open hostilities commenced later that year, British
naval forces were expected to take an active role in paci
fying the rebellious colonies. As Commander in Chief of
the Royal Navy’s North American Squadron, Vice Ad
miral Samuel Graves had the unenviable responsibility of
implementing these naval aspects of British imperial
policy.
Admiral Graves was sixty-one years old when he was
appointed to command the North American Squadron in
March 1774. Although he had worked his way up in the
service by regular promotion, his career to date had not
been outstanding, and he did not have the reputation of
a fighter or great administrator.1 Graves did have, how
ever, the support of the First Lord of the Admiralty,
Lord Sandwich. Theoretically, selection of the Com

mander of the North American Squadron was a matter
for Cabinet consideration, but Sandwich had far more in
fluence in the selection than the other Cabinet members
and was able to secure Graves’ nomination over the
doubts of some of his colleagues.2
Under Samuel Graves’ leadership the North American
Squadron had been totally ineffective in either isolating
or pacifying the insurrection. Not only had the squadron
failed to provide the British forces in Boston with suffici
ent provisions and supplies, but it had also been humili
ated by rebel whaleboat activity in Boston harbor and
by daring rebel attacks on His Majesty’s vessels in other
ports. The series of embarrassing incidents that occurred
in the summer of 1775 finally convinced Graves that his
‘semi-neutral’ conduct had failed. The task of isolating
and pacifying the colonial rebellion was both enormous
and unique, and Graves had expected that the British
government would supply him with detailed directives
as to how to proceed under these difficult circumstances.
But by late August he realized that waiting for specific
orders was fruitless and that he had to resort to much
more vigorous naval action.
Graves’ orders to his captains reflect this change of atti
tude. On 10 September 1775, for example, he command
ed Captain George Vandeput of the Asia to fire on the
port of New York should its inhabitants refuse to supply
British vessels. In order to demonstrate that British
threats were not idle, Graves suggested that Vandeput
fire first on the house of one ‘Traitor Sear.’3 One week
later he ordered Captain James Wallace of the Rose “to
take, burn, sink, and destroy all and every Pirate or Re
bel [vessel he encountered] . . .And . . to lay waste
and destroy every Town or Place from whence Pirates
are fitted out.”4 At last Graves had abandoned his
‘semi-neutrality’ in favor of an active role for the Navy
in pacifying the rebellious colonies.
Feeling that the colonial insurgents had taken advan
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tage of his leniency, Graves initiated a plan to destroy
some of the more delinquent coastal towns to the north
east of Boston.5 Writing in 1776, Graves stated that up un
til the end of August 1775 he had hoped that the Amer
ican colonies might somehow be reconciled with Great
Britain. This sentiment in addition to the lack of specific
orders for his future conduct had caused him to confine
the Navy’s operations to intercepting rebel contraband,
guarding supplies intended for British forces and convoy
ing Army transports. By late August, however, he deter
mined to wait no longer. Since the Admiral had ex
perienced negligible success in apprehending smugglers
and privateers in open water, he now decided to destroy
their bases of operation—the coastal towns of central
and eastern New England.6 More importantly, he de
cided to pacify the insurgency by means of what could
be regarded as strategic naval bombardment, hoping
thereby to destroy the colonists’ will to resist.
Admiral Graves shared his plans with General Thomas
Gage on 1 September. The Admiral listed his reasons for
taking more vigorous actions: “repeated Insults and Loss
es His Majesty’s Squadron has sustained .
the King’s
People killed and made Prisoners; Light Houses de
stroyed, Commerce interrupted, And the Preparations
for War Daily making in the different Towns.” Graves
then said that he wanted to “lay Waste such Sea Port
Towns in the New England Governments as are not like
ly to be useful to His Majesty’s Stores and to destroy all
the Vessels within the Harbours.” In order to carry out
his ambitious design he requested troops, transports and
artillery from Gage.7 The General displayed neither great
enthusiasm nor hostility to Graves’ plan, but promised to
assist the Admiral as much as possible, also informing
Graves that he could only spare two transports, the Sym
metry and the Spitfire. Gage expressed his regret that
“something of this kind” had not been proposed earlier,
when he might have furnished substantial assistance.8
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Graves later wrote that in September 1775 he was “im
patient to revenge the Insults shown his Cruizers, and to
scourge the Inhabitants of these Sea Port Towns/’9 Yet
he did not propose this pacification scheme merely out
of revenge; he had additional motivation. Several times
during the summer of 1775 the First Lord of the British
Admiralty had sent Graves private memoranda recom
mending that his protege assume a more vigorous role in
pacifying the rebellion. In late July Lord Sandwich ad
vised Graves to exert himself “to the utmost towards
crushing the rebellion .
[without] delicacies.” The
First Lord hinted that censure could easily result from in
activity but never from “doing too much/’10 Other
insinuations that Samuel Graves’ position as commander
of British naval forces in North American waters was in
jeopardy continued that summer. In a private letter
dated 25 August 1775 Sandwich bluntly informed Graves
of the existence of numerous complaints, originating in
the colonies but finding strong reverberations in Britain,
that the North American Squadron was in essence doing
nothing to suppress the rebellion. Lord Sandwich pa
tronizingly reminded Graves that only through the form
er’s efforts at persuasion and manipulation was the latter
in retention of his command. Without suggesting any spe
cific naval measures, Sandwich begged Graves to supply
him with some evidence that he was making the insur
gents feel “the weight of an English fleet/’11

News of Lexington and Concord had convinced all the
Cabinet members, except Lord Dartmouth, of the neces
sity for vigorous use of military and naval force in pacify
ing the colonies. Although the strategic goals of Britain’s
policy of imperial pacification were still in the process of
definition, the realization that a show of force would be
necessary was now apparent.12 Essentially, Sandwich
was warning Admiral Graves of the new attitude in
Ministry. Although impossible to document completely,
the assumption that Graves’ proposed expedition was in
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large part a response to Sandwich’s proddings seems rea
sonable. Naval bombardment of coastal towns was a
means of implementing a ‘get tough’ approach to the
problem of imperial pacification, while at the same time
providing Lord Sandwich with the evidence necessary to
secure the Admiral’s command from the intentions of his
critics.
Despite increasing lack of cooperation from General
Gage and the absence of definite orders from the Ad
miralty, Admiral Graves proceeded with preparations for
a coastal expedition.13 The transports Symmetry and Spit
fire required considerable repair and carpentry work,
since they were to be armed with mortars and howitzers.
Graves assigned all the carpenters and caulkers of his
squadron to work on these two ships.14 During this time
of preparation the personal dispute between Graves and
Gage flared up again. The Admiral complained that
Gage interfered with the preparations by making it diffi
cult for the Navy to obtain mortar shells and other
stores.15 Writing to a relative in Parliament, Graves
charged that General Gage desired “to stamp upon
[him]
. the imputation of negligence.” Yet Graves as
sured his relative that for the sake of his country he
would maintain the “Appearance of civility . . with
the Commander of Land if possible.”16
Whatever fears and reservations Samuel Graves may
still have had on the matter of exceeding his authority by
sending out a coastal bombardment expedition were al
layed on 4 October with the belated arrival of the British
sloop Raven, which carried new formal directives from
the Admiralty.17 The Lords Commissioners of the Ad
miralty informed Graves of George Ill’s “firm Resolution
that every measure be pursued for suppressing by the
most vigorous Efforts by Sea & Land, this unnatural
Rebellion.” They directed Admiral Graves to carry on
such operations in New England waters as Graves
deemed “most effectual for suppressing . . the Rebel
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lion.” In addition to this broad, discretionary directive
the Admiralty ordered Graves to signify publicly to all
coastal towns that should violence be committed against
any British official or loyalist, should men be armed and
raised, should any military works be erected or should
any attempt be made to seize or destroy British supply
and ammunition magazines, “it will be the duty of
[Graves’ squadron] . . to proceed, by the most vigor
ous efforts, against the said Town, as in open Rebellion
against the King.”18

This Admiralty Office communication, which originat
ed from Lord Dartmouth, was strikingly similar to Dart
mouth’s letter to General Gage of 27 January 1775, which
Gage interpreted as his marching orders in Massachu
setts. In the latter Dartmouth wrote some strongly
worded passages but balanced them with ’saving
clauses,’ reminding Gage of the discretionary nature of
his instructions.19 Likewise, Graves’ orders of 6 July con
tained some very severe directives, and certainly the spir
it of his instructions was belligerent. Yet Graves also was
left with a large degree of discretion as to how to imple
ment these directives. To be sure, the fact that it would
be impossible and even foolish for the Colonial Office to
issue minutely detailed orders to commanders in distant
North America would account for the discretionary na
ture of the orders to Gage and Graves. Yet these broad
directives could also neatly be used to shift the blame
for any unpopular action against the colonists from the
Ministry to the Army and Navy commanders serving in
America.
Although the orders brought by the Raven were not as
specific as he had wished, Admiral Graves judged that
their general spirit justified his coastal expedition. The
Admiral expressed his pleasure that the Admiralty’s or
ders “coincided exactly with what was then doing.”20 Af
ter the arrival of the Raven Graves’ tentative proposal
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coalesced into a definite naval operation with specific ob
jectives. Admiral Graves selected Lieutenant Henry
Mowat of the Canceaux to command the expedition. At
forty-one years of age, Mowat had about fifteen years
experience in New England waters. Since 1764 he had
been employed on a survey of the New England coast.
Graves obviously chose Lieutenant Mowat to command
the mission because of his intimate knowledge of the
coast and his experience in dealing with some of the
coastal towns.21

On 6 October 1775 Admiral Graves issued his orders
to Lieutenant Mowat. Informing him that the expedition
was designed to “chastize” the towns of Marblehead,
Salem, Newburyport, Cape Ann, Ipswich, Portsmouth,
Saco, Falmouth and Machias, Graves ordered Mowat to
sail to as many of these communities as possible, making
“the most vigourous Efforts to burn the Towns, and de
stroy the Shipping in the Harbours.” The Admiral indi
cated that Cape Ann and Machias, which had been the
scenes of very embarrassing incidents involving Navy
vessels, were especially to be objects of retribution.22
Graves cautioned Mowat not to risk the lives of his men
by attempting an occupation at any of the towns. Rath
er, Mowat was to be content with “falling upon the Re
bels, doing what [he could] with Expedition and coming
away before they . . [could] assemble to cut off your
Retreat.” Graves told Lieutenant Mowat to differentiate,
where possible, between loyalists and rebels, protecting
and defending the former while punishing the latter. The
Admiral added one last warning. The intent of the
expedition was punishing the rebels and thereby hopeful
ly breaking their will to resist, but under no circum
stance was Mowat to permit plundering of any sort.
Graves made it clear that he would deal harshly with
anyone caught in such activity. As to the duration of the
operation and the specific means of destruction, Lieuten
ant Mowat was given some latitude, but both men under
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stood that naval bombardment was the less risky and
more spectacular means of making the population “feel
the weight of an English fleet/’23 Admiral Graves also is
sued orders to all other Navy captains stationed in New
England waters, informing them of Mowat’s expedition
and ordering them to assist it whenever possible.24

Lieutenant Mowat’s squadron sailed from Nantasket
on 8 October on what was to be Admiral Graves’ first
and only significant naval operation during his eighteen
month tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the North
American Squadron. The small flotilla consisted of the
flagship Canceaux, an armed ship of eight guns; the
schooner Halifax, a newly-built vessel of six guns; the
Symmetry, an armed transport outfitted with mortars
and howitzers; and the Spitfire, an armed sloop also
carrying mortars and howitzers.25 The four vessels repre
sented only a small increment of the total strength of the
North American Squadron, which by this time consisted
of betw een thirty and forty vessels.26 Mowat also carried
one hundred men commanded by Captain Forster of the
Royal Marines.27

Admiral Graves, attempting to keep the intention and
destination of the expedition a secret, even ordered the
stores for Mowat’s flotilla to be loaded quietly at night.28
Nevertheless, the Americans received intelligence reports
from Boston that an expeditionary force had been pre
pared and had sailed for some destination to the east
ward. One Bostonian’s diary entry for 3 October men
tioned the departure of several armed vessels from Bos
ton’s inner harbor on a secret mission, which was ru
mored to be directed at Cape Ann.29 George Washing
ton, then commanding colonial forces surrounding Bos
ton, received exaggerated intelligence that on 3 October
a large fleet carrying six hundred men departed Boston.
Since Washington’s informer made special note of the
fact that the British vessels carried mortars, howitzers
and other artillery, Washington concluded that the ‘fleet’
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intended to bombard some coastal town. By 13 October
Washington knew that the expedition’s destination was
some town or towns to the eastward of Boston.30
Meanwhile, Mowat’s squadron encountered very
stormy weather during its first few days at sea, delaying
its arrival at the first objective, Cape Ann, until 11 Octo
ber. The Lieutenant maneuvered his vessels close to
shore but did not attack the town. Lieutenant Grant, the
expedition’s artillery officer,31 felt that Cape Ann’s build
ings were too widely scattered for effective naval bom
bardment, especially considering the limited number of
available carcasses—hollow iron cases filled with com
bustibles.32 Mowat, eager to make a smart showing on
his first attempt and equally anxious not to supply the
provincials with the further encouragement that an unsuc
cessful bombardment would provide, accepted Grant’s
advice and departed “not without reluctance” for an
other port.33
The next morning a strong northwesterly wind carried
the flotilla past Newburyport, Ipswich, Portsmouth and
Saco to a point off Cape Elizabeth, just south of Fal
mouth in Casco Bay.34 Once again stormy autumnal
weather hindered the expedition’s progress. The vessels
were forced to seek shelter at Boothbay Harbor and re
mained there three days. On 16 October the small squad
ron left Boothbay Harbor and anchored at the mouth of
Falmouth’s harbor.35
The objective now at the mercy of the British vessels
was eastern New England’s most important seaport and
former site of the most remote of the British custom
houses in New England. Falmouth was a small commer
cial town of two- and three-story buildings nestled close
ly together near the tip of a narrow three mile long
peninsula that jutted out into island-dotted Casco Bay.36
Her nearly two thousand inhabitants generally were con
nected in some manner with maritime enterprises: mast
and lumber exporting, shipbuilding or maritime trade. In
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1768, for example, Falmouth had exported over four mil
lion feet of pine boards, almost ten times that of Ports
mouth-Kittery and Boston combined.37 And in 1773 Fal
mouth residents owned 2,550 tons of shipping.38
The town of Falmouth had long established itself as a
community in opposition to the British metropolitan gov
ernment. Such opposition had frequently been mani
fested in various overt acts of disobedience. Falmouth’s
militancy dated from January 1766, when a mob burned
the town’s allotment of stamped papers provided for in
the Stamp Act.39 In August 1767 Francis Waldo, a cus
toms official, seized a quantity of rum and sugar belong
ing to a Falmouth resident because of a breach of reven
ue legislation. A mob soon gathered and attacked the
house of the customs comptroller, Arthur Savage. Upon
finding Waldo a guest in the Savage home, the mob de
tained the two men, while another group broke into the
customhouse and removed the confiscated goods to safe
ty.40 Two men were jailed for their part in the proceed
ings, but once again a mob came to the rescue and aided
them in their escape. Three years later a group of Fal
mouth inhabitants attacked the unpopular Savage be
cause of his zeal in enforcing the despised revenue
laws.41 When tea ships arrived in Boston in 1773, the peo
ple of Falmouth resolved in a town meeting not to buy
or sell any East India tea until the duty was repealed.42
On 14 June 1774 bells tolled all day in a demonstration
of Falmouth’s sympathy with the plight of Boston with
its port closed by the British.43 Thus by 1775 Falmouth
had acquired a reputation of being “Boston’s younger sis
ter in rebellion.’’44
During the first half of 1775 two incidents had rein
forced this reputation: The Gaspee desertion incident
and Thompson’s W ar. In February four seamen deserted
the British Xavy brig Gaspee which was anchored in Fal
mouth harbor. Lieutenant Hunter, commander of the
brig, felt that sending a boat ashore to recapture these
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men would be too risky, since some Falmouthers had
threatened to destroy the Gaspee or any other British ves
sel that attempted to remove the deserters. Hunter there
upon sailed to Boston where Admiral Graves immediate
ly ordered him back to Falmouth to obtain the sailors
and to check “the Insolence of threatning the King’s
Ships, by assuring them that if they committed any act
of violence against . . his Majesty’s Officers or Sea
men or destroyed any of the King’s Stores,
that . . [Samuel Graves] would take the severest mea
sures to distress them the Law would allow.” Hunter
made Graves’ threat known to the people of Falmouth.
They replied politely to Lieutenant Hunter’s communica
tion and permitted British sailors to come ashore “with
out being insulted.” The deserters, however, had left the
town.45
The Thompson’s War incident in the spring of 1775
also magnified Falmouth’s revolutionary reputation, if
not among other colonists, at least in Admiral Graves’
mind. This rather complicated incident began on 2
March 1775 when the merchant sloop John and Mary ar
rived in Falmouth, Maine, from Bristol, England, with
rigging, sails and stores for a ship being built by Thomas
Coulson, a Falmouth merchant. Since Coulson’s ship was
being built for a Bristol merchant, the local Committee
of Inspection convened to ascertain whether Coulson
was violating the Continental Association.46 The Com
mittee decided that Coulson’s unloading of rigging and
sails from the John and Mary and appropriation of them
to outfit his new ship with the intention of sending that
ship to England would constitute a violation of the As
sociation. Consequently, the Committee ordered the Fal
mouth merchant to send the supplies back promptly.47
Coulson stalled, maintaining that the John and Mary
needed repairs and was unfit to put to sea. The Fal
mouth Committee consulted a group of ships’ carpen
ters, riggers and caulkers on the matter and, based on
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their opinion, gave Coulson until 14 March to repair the
sloop and send her back to Bristol. When on 15 March
the John and Mary was still in port, the Committee, in
accordance with the Continental Association, publicly
proclaimed Thomas Coulson a violator of the Associa
tion.48
Meanwhile, Falmouth’s loyalist sheriff, William Tyng,
had written to General Gage for assistance. Gage in turn
handed the matter over to Admiral Graves.49 Graves
promptly ordered Lieutenant Henry Mowat in the armed
ship Canceaux to Falmouth in order to assist Coulson.50
Mowat arrived in Falmouth early in April. But despite
Mowat’s presence, Coulson could not hire enough men
to help him unload the Bristol sloop. It therefore took
over one month to prepare Coulson’s new ship.51
During that month the Canceaux's presence in Fal
mouth harbor caused considerable uneasiness for the
town’s patriots. W hen a small tender arrived to supply
Mowat, the town was thrown into panic.52 On 30 April a
diarist wrote that Falmouth’s inhabitants were “continual
ly disquieted, apprehensive that [Falmouth] . . . and
the whole country are inevitably and entirely ruined.”53
The sense of uneasiness was also experienced by the
town’s loyalist population. On 24 April several “Friends
to the British Constitution,” fearful of. some rebel plot to
confine them, sought refuge onboard the Canceaux. Fal
mouth’s customs officials complained that as soon as
Mowat left they would risk losing their records, effects,
and quite possibly their lives. These officials begged
their superiors in Boston to apply to Gage and Graves
for protecting them when Mowat left.54 And on 2 May a
group of eighteen prominent Falmouth loyalists peti
tioned Lieutenant Mowat to remain in port until they
could notify Gage and Graves of their situation. They
too stated their profound fears that once Mowat left they
would be “prey to the Sons of Rapine and lawless Vio
lence.”55
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To add to the tension, rumors circulated that a group
of Brunswick radicals were preparing to come to Fal
mouth to attack the Canceaux.56 The Falmouth Com
mittee of Correspondence, feeling that any such attempt
would lay “a foundation for the destruction” of the
town, wrote to the Brunswick Committee, requesting
that they prevent an attack on Mowat. In addition they
wrote to Colonel Samuel Thompson, leader of the radi
cals, asking him to desist. Thompson replied that he had
dropped his plans to come to Falmouth.57
Contrary to his reply, Colonel Thompson landed with
about sixty men on the back side of Falmouth Neck on 7
May. His band of backwoods patriots concealed them
selves in a thick stand of trees for two days. But on 9
May they seized Mowat, Reverend Wiswell (the local
Anglican minister) and a Navy surgeon as the group took
a leisurely walk in the woods.58 As soon as the Can
ceaux s master, Ensign Hogg, heard of this, he informed
the inhabitants of Falmouth that if Mowat and the others
were not released shortly, he would fire on the town. To
dramatize the ultimatum, Hogg fired two blank shots at
the town. One witness recalled the effect of Hogg’s ulti
matum on the inhabitants of Falmouth:
You can hardly conceive the consternation, confusion, and uproar
that immediately ensued. Our women were, I believe, every one of
them in tears, or praying, or screaming;
widows [were] hurrying
their goods into countrymen’s carts, never asking their names, though
strangers, and carrying their children out of Town.
Some per
sons bed-rid, or in childbed, were hastily removed, with no small dan
ger of their lives.59

Many Falmouth citizens begged Thompson to release
the men. Some loyalists apparently even called for Fal
mouth’s militia to rescue Mowat from the Brunswick
men. Most inhabitants, however, tried to remain neutral
and attempted to save their homes. Colonel Thompson
was unwilling to deliver his prisoners, insisting that there
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was “open and settled war between the Colonies and Bri
tain/' But he soon realized that the whole town opposed
his methods.60 Thompson then consented to free Mowat
and the others for the night, if they promised to return
the next morning at which time some sort of settlement
could be arranged.61 Promises were made, and Mowat,
expressing his gratitude to the townspeople for their ef
forts on his behalf, returned to the Canceaux.62
All through the night militiamen from outlying settle
ments converged on Falmouth. When Mowat failed to
come ashore in the morning, these men became quite
rowdy.63 Lieutenant Mowat sent word that he had fully
intended to honor his promise, but that earlier in the
morning he had been informed of threats on his life.64
The officers of the various militia companies formed a
committee to plan their next move. The committee
voted to destroy the Canceaux, but they remained unde
cided as how to do it. The militia officers then instituted
a kangaroo court of sorts, hauling in suspected loyalists
and extorting money from them. On 11 May a mob of
militiamen broke into Thomas Coulson’s house and used
it as a headquarters. Finding a quantity of New England
rum in the cellar, a great many of them became drunk.
One Calvin Lombard, “being raised with liquor,” went
down to the wharves and fired a musket at the Canceaux. Mowat threatened to fire on the town because of
this, and once again Falmouth’s residents panicked.65 Not
only was a British naval vessel threatening to bombard
the town, but also Falmouth was host to several compan
ies of rowdy and sometimes drunken militia.
By 12 May the rural militia finally drifted back home.
The departing radicals had only unkind remarks for Fal
mouth’s inhabitants. Some militiamen apparently stated
that Lieutenant Mowat should have bombarded the
town. For their part, the people of Falmouth felt that
Colonel Thompson planned the whole affair to humble
Falmouth “for its arrogance in sending a message to
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Thompson . . to dissuade him from taking the ships
[Canceaux and Coulson’s new ship].”66 The incident,
known as ‘Thompson’s W ar,’ ended on 15 May when
Mowat received the following communication from the
people of Falmouth: “the Town disapproved of the pro
ceedings of the armed body, but . we were unable
to resist them.” The same day the Canceaux and Coulton’s ship, the Minerva, weighed anchor and sailed for
Portsmouth.67
During Colonel Thompson’s occupation the Falmouth
Committee wrote to the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety, complaining of Thompson’s “rash and Injudici
ous, if not unjustifiable” attempt to take the Canceaux.
The Falmouth Committee objected to the militia’s rowdi
ness and their extortion of funds from local loyalists.
Also the Committee advised that future operations
against the British should be conducted by proper offi
cers in an orderly fashion, “lest it should occasion a civil
War Among ourselves.” The Falmouth Committee men
tioned that Thompson’s action would probably arouse
Admiral Graves.68 This was indeed the case, for the Gaspee incident and Thompson’s War, according to Graves,
caused Falmouth’s inclusion on the list of seaport towns
to be ‘pacified’ by Mowat.69
Despite the events of Thompson’s War, Falmouth con
tinued to uphold the patriotic cause. Falmouth raised a
militia to fight for the revolutionary cause. In addition
the town frequently shipped supplies on coastal schoon
ers to Newburyport, avoiding Graves’ blockade around
Boston. From Newburyport they were transported over
land to the insurgent forces surrounding Boston. This ac
tivity had not gone unnoticed, however, and the town of
Falmouth would shortly pay a dear price for its patriotic
inclinations.70
The appearance of Lieutenant Mowat’s vessels on 16
October 1775 did not create any great consternation in
Falmouth. Because the inhabitants surmised that the
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small squadron was merely on a foraging expedition in
search of livestock and other stores for British forces in
Boston, the only defensive measure taken was the dis
patch of a good percentage of the Falmouth militia to is
lands in Casco Bay in order to protect the town s live
stock and hay.71 The four British ships spent most of 17
October fighting a strong wind as they proceeded to
form a line directly abreast of the compact part of the
town. The sight of the1 squadron working its way oppo
site the town greatly alarmed the townspeople. Many be
gan to transport their belongings to areas safely outside
of Falmouth. Yet one resident, Daniel "fucker, recalled
that this alarm subsided when Falmouth’s residents
learned that Henry Mowat commanded the force.72 They
believed that Mowat would not forget the efforts they
had made to secure his release during Thompson’s War.
As soon as the flotilla anchored abreast of the town
late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Mowat sent his junior of
ficer, Lieutenant Frasier, ashore with a written message
for the people of Falmouth. A crowd of curious resi
dents met him dockside and followed the naval officer
to the town’s meetinghouse. There Frasier delivered the
message to a lawyer who read it before a large audi
ence.73 This communication summarized the town’s of
fenses and informed the townspeople of Admiral Craves’
order to execute a “just Punishment.”
After so many premeditated attacks on the legal Prerogatives of the
best of Sovereigns. After the repeated Instances you have experienced
in Britain’s long forbearance of the Bod of Correction; and the Merci
ful and Paternal extension of her Hands to embrace you, again and
again; have been regarded as vain and nugatory. And in place of a
dutiful and grateful return to your King and Parent State; you have
been guilty of the most unpardonable Rebellion, supported by tin*
Ambition of a set of designing men, whoso insidious views have
brought the whole into the same Dilemma; which leads me to feel not
a little for the Innocent of them, in particular on the present occasion,
having it in orders to Execute a just Punishment on the Town of Palmouth. In the name of which Authority I previously warn you to re
move without delay the Human Species out of the said town; for
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which purpose I give you the time of two hours; at the period of
which, a Red pendant will be hoisted at the Maintopgallant Masthead
with a gun: but should your imprudence lead you to show the least re
sistance, you will in that case free me of that Humanity, so strongly
pointed out in m\’ orders as well as my own Inclination. I also ob
serve that all those who upon a former occasion [during Thompson’s
War] fly to the King’s Ship under my Command for Protection, that
same door is now open and ready to receive them.74

The people were stunned. Mowat’s ultimatum was no
thing less than a declaration of war. Reverend Jacob Bail
ey, a loyalist eyew itness, noted that “a frightful consterna
tion ran through the assembly, every heart was seized
with terror, every countenance change colour, and a pro
found silence ensued for several moments.”75 After a sec
ond reading Lieutenant Frasier, obviously cognizant of
the delicacy of the situation, declared his willingness to
convey any message to Mowat. The inhabitants of Fal
mouth decided to send an ad hoc committee of dis
tinguished citizens—Jediah Preble, Nathaniel Coffin and
Robert Pagan—to deal with Lieutenant Mow at personal
ly.76 Once on board the Canceaux the committee de
manded to know’ the nature of the “just Punishment."
Mowat, they claimed, informed them that his orders
were to “bum, sink, and destroy." He asserted that the
town’s crimes did not give it “the least right to expect
any lenity." Further, Mowat stated that in sending his
communication to the people of Falmouth he risked his
commission, since Admiral Graves did not authorize the
giving of any w arning to the tow nspeople. The three Fal
mouth men protested against the severity of Graves' or
ders and pleaded w ith Mowat to spare the town or at
least grant additional time to allow’ the inhabitants to re
move some of their effects. At length Mow at, out of the
“known humanity of the British nation," offered a com
promise. If the residents of Falmouth w ould deliver all
their arms and ammunition to the British, he w’ould defer
from executing his orders until an express could be sent
to Boston to obtain further instructions from Admiral
Graves.77
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The ad hoc committee replied that they would com
municate Mowat’s offer to the town. Yet they added that
to educate the whole town of Mowat’s proposal and then
to reach a decision was impossible all in the same even
ing. Realizing that the day was nearly spent, the Lieuten
ant agreed to postpone any action until 8:00 A.M. the
next day, 18 October, if a token number of small arms
were delivered to him presently. If his demand for the
surrender of all arms and ammunition was not met at
that time, he would commence bombardment promptly
at 9:00 A.M. The British officer also warned that if
he perceived “the lest hostile appearnce of any kind
whatsoever” he could consider his offer void and act
accordingly.78
Preble, Coffin and Pagan returned to shore and in
formed the townspeople of Lieutenant Mowat’s terms.
The people of Falmouth unalterably opposed the surren
der of all their arms and ammunition but also realized
that expediency dictated the prompt delivery of a few
muskets. The ad hoc committee sent the muskets to the
Canceaux with a message that the town would meet ear
ly the next morning and would send their final answer to
Mowat by 8:00 A.M.79
The inhabitants spent the next twelve hours in frantic
efforts to save as many personal possessions as possible.
Reverend Bailey recalled that women and children ran
out of town, and the aged and ill left their habitations.80
The fortunate secured horse or oxen teams to haul their
goods to neighboring towns or to a sheltered area on the
far side of town, well out of range of the British guns.
One merchant secured two teams of horses and loaded
his wagons with as much as he could. He then loaded a
barge with W est Indian warehouse goods, sending it
around Falmouth Xeck to safety.81 But a shortage of
available teams hindered the efforts of many.82 And to
add to Falmouth’s troubles, some companies of rural mili
tia arrived in town during the evening hours, supposedly
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announcing that if the town complied with the British,
they would burn it to the ground themselves. In order to
prevent any possible provocation by these militiamen a
number of Falmouth volunteers policed the streets until
daylight.83
When the sun rose on the morning of 18 October, the
task of removing possessions was far from complete. Peo
ple trying to save what they could still scurried through
Falmouth’s streets.84 Whether the people of Falmouth ac
tually did meet that morning to consider Mowat’s offer
is impossible to ascertain from the extant accounts. The
ad hoc committee’s report stated that the townspeople
did convene early in the morning and decided not to sur
render their arms to the British.85 Yet in Lieutenant Mo
wat’s report to Admiral Graves this same committee al
legedly reported to Mowat that “to their no small aston
ishment .
no part of the inhabitants assembled in the
morning and that the w hole tow n w as then in the great
est confusion writh many women and children still re
maining in it.”86 Other accounts do not mention such a
meeting, but only relate the frantic efforts of the popu
lace in removing their private effects.87 At any rate, whe
ther by default or formal decision, the people of Fal
mouth refused to surrender their arms. Preble, Coffin
and Pagan once again visited Mowat and tried to stall
for more time. They managed to remain onboard the
Canceaux until 8:30 A.M., but Mowat finally tired of
their delaying tactics and gave them one half hour to
clear the town.88
At 9:40 A.M. on the “calm clear and pleasant” autumn
morning of 18 October 1775 a seaman hoisted a flag
atop the Canceaux’s maintopgallant masthead. The flag
signaled the commencement of a severe naval bombard
ment w7hich lasted about eight hours and left most of Fal
mouth in ashes. Despite Mowat’s repeated warnings,
many people remained in the tow n, risking their lives to
save more of their belongings. The British aimed their
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first shots high to further warn these inhabitants. The ini
tial shots “struck . . [the] multitude into instant alarm
and amazement/’ Oxen that were being used in these en
deavors became “terrified at the smoak and report of the
guns [and] ran with precipitation over the rocks, dashing
everything in pieces, and scattering large quantities of
goods about the streets.’’89 The four British vessels then
hurled a “horrible shower of balls,
. bombs, car
casses, live shells, grapeshot, and [even] musket balls”
from their howitzers, mortars and cannon.90
Because of the poor quality of the ammunition, a stiff
wind blowing away from the town and the makeshift ef
forts of the inhabitants to extinguish fires, the cannon
balls and carcasses had relatively little effect during the
first several hours of the cannonade, outside of the tre
mendous and incessant roar of their report.91 This con
vinced Mowat of the necessity of sending landing parties
ashore to set fire to the many structures and vessels that
were escaping destruction. Mowat organized a few land
ing parties totalling thirty seamen and marines under the
command of Lieutenant Frasier. These parties landed
ashore at 3:00 P.M., set fire to a considerable number of
buildings and rowed back to the flotilla by 4:00 P.M.92
One Falmouth resident recalled that the British “landed
in their boats from all their vessels at the same moment
and threw their torches into the doors and windows of
the houses and stores.”93
Although a considerable number of colonial militia
had gathered in the Falmouth area, the British landing
parties faced only unorganized skirmishing.94 Small
groups of militiamen ran down from positions of safety
overlooking the town and fired a few shots at the British.
For all its rhetoric of the last several months, the rural
militia only wounded two of the attackers.95 According
to Falmouth’s selectmen this skirmishing saved from
twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the town’s struc
tures.96 But undoubtedly, any form of concerted resis
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tance against the landing forces could have saved more.
The defenders of Falmouth did not even attempt to at
tack Mowat’s flotilla because of a lack of powder and us
able artillery.97
The effect of the landing parties, a change in the direc
tion of the wind and the constant bombardment caused
the conflagration to spread. Reverend Bailey wrote a vi
vid description of the scene:
Bombs and carcasses armed with destruction and streaming with
fire blazed dreadful through the air, and descended with flaming ven
geance on the defenceless buildings
The crackling of the
flames, the falling of the houses, the bursting of shells, the heavy thun
der of the cannon threw the elements into frightful noise and commo
tion, and occasioned the very foundations of surrounding nature to
quake and tremble. Now lengthening pyramids of fire ascended hor
ribly bright from the dissolving structures, and the inhabitations of
pride, vanity, and affluence crumbled to ashes, while their late posses
sors beheld the shocking appearance with a mixture of astonishment
and humble indignation.98

By sunset when the firing ceased, “the body of the
town was in one flame.”99 Mowat’s flotilla then weighed
anchor and departed the harbor, leaving Falmouth “a
melancholy heap of ruins.”100 Since the wind had died
down, the vessels’ progress was slow. This afforded the
colonials an opportunity to fire their muskets at the Brit
ish ships. Although the vessels took a few hours to
maneuver beyond the Americans’ range, the musketry
did no damage.101 Before he left, Mowat offered the
town’s loyalists free passage to Boston. None left be
cause they feared being shot by the rebels if they at
tempted to board the British vessels. Also they were re
luctant to leave behind whatever personal possessions sur
vived.102
Approximately three fourths of Falmouth’s buildings
were destroyed in the conflagration. The British com
pletely devastated the lower and compact end of town;
almost every store or warehouse was consumed. St.
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Paul’s Episcopal Church, a new courthouse, the old meet
inghouse, the public library, a distillery and nearly all the
wharves were destroyed. The town lost about 130 dwell
ings which had housed 160 families.103 Few structurally
sound buildings remained. Many were so damaged that
they could not be occupied by their owners. The bom
bardment, for example, completely ruined the front of
the town’s new meetinghouse.104
Falmouth lost more than buildings. Upon arriving in
the harbor on the 16th, Mowat had trapped thirteen ves
sels in port, several having valuable cargoes onboard.
Mowat captured two as they attempted to escape; the
others were destroyed in the bombardment.105 Despite
their frenzied attempts to remove their belongings, the
people of Falmouth also lost substantial amounts of per
sonal possessions. The selectmen estimated that only one
half of the town’s movable goods survived the bombard
ment.106 Although much of the loss was from the actual
cannonade, some loyalists claimed that colonial radicals
stole many of their personal effects. One loyalist stated
that since wagon teams were unavailable, he spent the
several hours before the bombardment removing his
furniture and goods to his garden. He complained that
“a good deal was Stolefn] and the most of the remainder
broken or torn in pieces.”107 The loyalist Reverend Bail
ey claimed in his inimitable style that “a multitude of vil
lains were purloining their [Falmouth residents’, especial
ly loyalists’] goods and carrying them into the country be
yond the reach of justice.” Bailey stated that more was
ravished by the “hands of barbarous rapine, than con
sumed by the unrelenting rapacity of the
flames
”108
Falmouth officials estimated the total loss in buildings,
personal estate and cartage to be nearly £55,000.109 This
figure does not begin to measure the suffering and incon
venience. Even Reverend Bailey, who did not censure
Mowat’s action, lamented over the destitution of many
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families “who twenty-four hours before enjoyed in tran
quility their commodious habitations, [and] were
now . . . destitute of a hut
and as a tedious winter
was approaching they had before them a most gloomy
and distressing prospect/410 In one instance twenty-three
people were forced to inhabit a single small dwelling,
with three beds in the kitchen.111 The people of Fal
mouth were indeed destitute. Not only had they lost
their homes and many of their possessions, but also their
means of employment. Throughout the winter of
1775-1776 their very survival depended upon charity.112
During the course of the bombardment the British
squadron had fired an estimated three thousand rounds
of shot plus a number of carcasses and bombs into the
town.113 Miraculously no one was killed on either side.
The Americans claimed to have killed several men in the
landing parties, but Lieutenant Mowat’s report to Ad
miral Graves revealed that none were killed and only
two men were slightly wounded.114 Mowat did lose a
few men by desertion. Stating that he chose to fight for
the colonists’ cause, one member of a landing party,
John Armstrong, voluntarily surrendered himself to a
group of colonial militia.115 Three of the Halifax's sea
men deserted at North Yarmouth, Maine, while Mowat’s
flotilla anchored there after leaving Falmouth. All three
had been pressed into the Royal Navy and had eagerly
awaited their first opportunity to desert.116
Lieutenant Mowat decided to terminate the coastal
expedition after the destruction of only one of the nine
designated towns. The prolonged cannonade caused con
siderable indirect damage to the British ships. One ves
sel, the Spitfire, sustained enough damage from the con
cussion of her howitzers to cause Mowat to fear for her
seaworthiness. Moreover, the small squadron had ex
pended nearly all its ammunition, and many of the men
were ill and unable to perform their duties.117 In fact the
master of the Halifax died of smallpox a few weeks after
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the Falmouth affair, and Admiral Graves quarantined the
whole crew as a precautionary measure.118
Before heading back to Boston, Mowat drafted a de
tailed report to Admiral Graves. In it he expressed no
sympathetic emotions for Falmouth's inhabitants. In
stead, he stated his deep concern and anger over the
poor performance of the artillery stores and the condi
tion of his ships and men. In fact a hint of an apologetic
attitude for not having executed a more thorough ‘pacifi
cation’ of the Falmouth area is evident in the report.
Mowat complained that the lack of a sufficient number
of troops prevented his making an effective sweep of
arms, ammunition and livestock in Casco Bay.119
Lieutenant Mowat’s flotilla arrived in Boston harbor on
the second day of November. Upon receiving Mowat’s
report, Admiral Graves seemed only mildly disappointed
that deficiencies in the artillery stores and the condition
of the ships had limited his ambitious coastal expedition
to the destruction of only one town. Graves was genuine
ly proud of Mowat’s accomplishment and attached great
er significance to the results of the operation than was
warranted. He proclaimed that the destruction of the
town was a severe “Stroke to the Rebels, Falmouth hav
ing long been a principal Magazine of all Kinds of mer
chandize, from whence besides supplying the scattered
Villages in . . . New Hampshire and Massachusetts Bay,
large Quantities of Goods were
. transported ... to
Newbury7 Port and from thence by land to the Rebel
Army around Boston.” Graves promised the Admiralty
Office that other pacifying expeditions would follow and
that he would “not allow the Rebels to remain quiet.”120
But the Falmouth affair was the last of such operations
for Admiral Samuel Graves. Winter approached, and
with it came news of Graves’ dismissal from command
of the North American Squadron. Lord Sandwich could
not appease the critics who called for Graves’ removal.
Admiral Graves’ attempt to answer the critics—the east144

em New England coastal expedition—came too late to
save his command.
The destruction of Falmouth received wide and ex
tensive coverage in the American press.121 Throughout
the colonies editors copied and printed two or three ac
counts of the affair from paper to paper. The most popu
lar and complete account appeared in the 19 October is
sue of the New England Chronicle of Salem, Massachu
setts. This version summarized events preceding the de
struction, the bombardment itself and the extent of dam
age. Referring to Mowat as an “execrable Monster,” the
account contained much patriotic rhetoric: “May heaven
protect an innocent, distressed People; and may their im
placable Enemies perish in the Fire they [Kindled] for
others ... no Mercy is to be expected from our savage
Enemies.”122 Several papers printed verbatim Mowat’s
communication to the people of Falmouth, while others
carried brief sketches of the bombardment written by
Pearson Jones, a Falmouth resident.123

Extant private correspondence indicates that the Fal
mouth affair was a matter of some discussion among
revolutionary leaders. George Washington termed Fal
mouth’s destruction “an Outrage exceeding in Barbarity
& Cruelty every hostile Act practised among civilized
Nations.”124 In mid-November Washington stated that
the Falmouth affair attested to the existence of “diabol
ical designs of [the British] Administration to prosecute
with unrelenting Fury, the most cruel, and savage war
that ever a Civilized Nation engaged in . . . .”125 Gener
al Nathaniel Green, roused to great indignation because
of Admiral Graves’ action, proclaimed in classic revolu
tionary rhetoric: “Fight or be slaves!”126

John Adams, then attending the Continental Congress
in Philadelphia, received numerous letters commenting
on Falmouth’s destruction. James Warren told Adams
that Admiral Graves’ action in ordering the coastal
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expedition was in his estimation the last straw in a long
succession of abuses: “What can we wait for now? What
more can we want to justifie any step to take, kill and de
stroy, to refuse them any refreshments, to apprehend our
enemies, to confiscate their goods and estates, to open
our ports to foreigners, and if practicable to form alli
ances . . . ”127 Essentially, Warren considered the de
struction of Falmouth and Graves’ order for similar treat
ment of other New England coastal towns as a frank Brit
ish declaration of war and suggested that the colonies re
act accordingly, even hinting at American independence.
Josiah Quincy, William Tudor and Reverend William
Gordon, acquaintances of Adams, shared similar senti
ments in their correspondence with him. Quincy saw Fal
mouth’s destruction as a demonstration of Britain’s inten
tion “to execute
. unrelenting Vengeance by every
Means in their Power.”128 Tudor passionately proclaimed
that popular opinion demanded that the colonies “throw
open . . . [their] Ports wide to all the World .... If
we must be Slaves, Let us be the slaves of Francef,]
Spain[,] Turkey, rather than slaves of ungrateful Bri
tain.”129 Gordon pointedly asked Adams how many more
towns were to be sacrificed to “the British Barbarians”
before the Continental Congress made “every exertion of
power & wisdom .
in opposing . . . [its] Enemies.130

A Salem woman, Elizabeth Smith, most perceptively
evaluated American reaction to the Falmouth affair
when she questioned whether the British really thought
that actions such as Falmouth’s destruction could ever
serve to reconcile the colonies with the metropolitan gov
ernment. She expressed her profound doubts as to wheth
er it was possible to believe Britain’s claims of being de
sirous of reconciliation, when such a “Wonton abuse of
Minnisterial power [is] exerted against Mil
lions . . who are condemned unheard . . . ”131
The burning of Falmouth resulted in more than mere
rhetoric. Many seaport communities, particularly those
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along the central New England coast, became very un
easy, daily expecting a visitation from British naval ves
sels.132 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, especially feared an
attack. When rumors circulated that Lieutenant Mowat
would return to Portsmouth after his squadron repaired
and resupplied at Boston, many of Portsmouth’s inhabi
tants transported their possessions safely inland to
Dover.133 The town petitioned General Washington for
soldiers and powder, but he could only spare the serv
ices of Brigadier General John Sullivan, who organized
Portsmouth’s defenses.134 The inhabitants of Cape Ann
and Salem reacted in a similar manner. Cape Ann’s resi
dents went so far as to remove the glass windows from
their meetinghouse and many dwellings. They fortified
their harbor, and took measures "to give the enemy a
warm reception.”135 Salem residents decided to block the
harbor channel with hulks and repaired the town’s
forts.136 All along the New England coast defense pre
parations continued throughout the remainder of 1775.
By January 1776 British intelligence sources reported that
all the port towns from Boston to Portsmouth were
strongly defended, and from Portsmouth to Casco Bay
"every harbor and Creek has some insignificant Re
doubt, Logwall or other defence, and upon the least
alarm, the Country people came in . . . .”137
British reaction to the destruction of Falmouth was
both mild and unbelieving. First news of the affair
reached England in mid-December 1775. Since these re
ports originated from colonial sources, many Britishers
viewed it as revolutionary propaganda or, if true, as justi
fied by the circumstances.138 The editor of Gentlemen s
Magazine refused to comment on the matter until it was
authenticated but added that "it cannot be true, or the
reasons for this severe order are concealed.”139 French
sources stated that English gazettes placed the Falmouth
affair in the context of the particular circumstances lead
ing to Graves’ orders.140 Admiral Graves’ official report
did not arrive at the Admiralty Office until the first of
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January 1776,141 and it apparently satisfied the major Brit
ish periodicals, for they printed nothing more on the mat
ter. Lord George Germain, the new Colonial Office
Secretary, however, raised the question as to whether
Graves was justified in destroying the town. Germain de
manded an explanation from General William Howe,
who had replaced Gage as overall commander of British
forces in North America. Thomas Hutchinson mentioned
in his diary that Lord Germain stated that Admiral
Graves had been admonished about his “remissness” in
failing to command his forces vigorously and that Ger
main imagined Graves would “run to the other ex
treme.”142 But even this critic remained silent once he re
ceived General W illiam Howe’s factual account of the
affair.143
The French government, which carefully watched
every development in the widening Anglo-American con
flict, was highly critical of the Falmouth affair.144 Count
de Guines, the French ambassador in London, informed
French Foreign Minister Vergennes of the town’s destruc
tion on 22 December 1775.145 About one week later Ver
gennes replied that such an action was “absurd as well as
barbaric” on Britain’s part, especially since Graves intend
ed to burn all the major maritime communities to the
eastward of Boston. The Foreign Minister asserted that
the destruction of Falmouth could conceivably be under
stood as an act of “furious and boundless despair” had
the British resolved to abandon the colonies. But since he
knew that Britain intended to send a large army to Amer
ica to pacify the colonies, the destruction of the New
England coastal towns would only destroy places for
shelter and storehouses which were essential if the British
desired to penetrate into the countryside.146 The French,
therefore, regarded Graves’ coastal bombardment
scheme as a strategic absurdity.
As a demonstration of the quandary of British imperial
policy formulation and implementation, the destruction
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of Falmouth was significant from a strategic point of
view. Admiral Graves’ attempt to pacify the central New
England coast by what could be regarded as strategic
naval bombardment was a unique case. Graves intended
that the Navy would destroy the morale of the coastal
population by leveling their towns. Falmouth never real
ly recovered during the course of the Revolution, and
the town still looked like a ruin in 1781.147 But like recent
attempts at strategic morale bombardment from the air,
Graves’ plan produced the opposite effect. Far from sur
rendering or abandoning their revolutionary zeal, the in
habitants of Falmouth petitioned General Washington for
troops and defensive supplies to protect the remnant of
the town. They also made known their determination “to
Exert the Utmost of their power in the Great cause in
which all America is .
Engag’d.”148 The Royal Navy’s
strategic bombardment only generated increased hostil
ity and resolve to resist to the end.
The Falmouth affair therefore contributed to the de
sire for independence from Britain. As early as one week
after the town’s destruction some colonists remarked that
independence was now necessary. Writing on 12 No
vember, a prominent Portsmouth resident, William
Whipple, stated that news of Falmouth’s destruction and
the threat of similar measures caused “everyone to risque
his all in Support of his Liberties & privileges . the
unheard of cruelties of the enemy have so effectually uni
fied us that I believe there are not four persons now in
Portsmouth who do not justify the measures persuing in
opposition to the Tyranny of Great Britain.”149 An article
in the 23 November issue of the New England Chronicle
eloquently connected the Falmouth affair with the need
to break with England:
The savage and brutal barbarity of our enemies in burning Fal
mouth, is a full demonstration that there is not the least remains of vir
tue, wisdom, or humanity in the British court; and that they are fully
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determined with fire and sword, to butcher and destroy, beggar and
enslave the whole American people. Therefore we expect soon to
break off all kinds of connection with Britain, and form into a Grand
Republic of the American Colonies, which will, by the blessing of
heaven, soon work out our salvation, and perpetuate the liberties, in
crease the wealth, the power and the glory of this Western world.150

150

NOTES
1 Allen, French, The First Tear of the American Revolution (New
York, 1968, reprint of the 1934 edition), 349.
2 Clifford August Morrison, “The Earl of Sandwich and British Nav
al Administration in the War of the American Revolution” (un
published Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1950), 80, 98;
Alan Valentine, Lord North (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press,
1967, 2 vols.), I, 431.
3 Graves to George Vandeput, 10 September 1775, in “The Con
duct of Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves:’ Gay Transcripts, Massachusetts
Historical Society, II, 207-08. Graves wrote the “Conduct” in 1776. It
contains copies of Graves’ correspondence with naval officers in
North America and with the Admiralty Office. The “Conduct” also in
cludes Graves’ personal narrative of events as he recalled them in
1776. Hereafter cited as “Conduct.”
4 Graves to James Wallace, 17 September 1775, in Ibid., 222-23;
Graves to Stephens, 26 September 1775, in Public Record Office, Ad
miralty Papers (Class I: Secretary’s Department, In-Letters), Vol. 485,
p. 364. Hereafter cited as Adm. 1/485.
5 See Graves’ summary of the decision to launch a coastal expedi
tion in Graves to Stephens, 9 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 401.
6 Narrative of Graves, 29 August 1775, in “Conduct,” II, 190-91;
Allen French, The First Year of the American Revolution (New York,
1934), 539.
7 Graves to Thomas Gage, 1 September 1775, in “Conduct,” II,
192-93.
8 Thomas Gage to Graves, 4 September 1775, in Ibid., 197-98.
9 Narrative of Graves, 1 September 1775, in Ibid., 194.
10 Lord Sandwich to Graves, 30 July 1775, in G.R. Barnes and J.H.
Owen (eds.), The Private Papers of John Earl of Sandwich, First
Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782 (Navy Records Society, Publica
tions, LXIX, LXXI, LXXV, LXXVII, London, 1932-38), LXIX, 66-67.
Hereafter cited as Sandwich MSS. In this memorandum Sandwich re
fers to other letters written earlier which contain similar recommenda
tions and warnings.
11 Lord Sandwich to Graves, 25 August 1775, in Ibid., 70-71. A
news item printed in the Virginia Gazette 26 August 1775 revealed the
nature of some of the complaints referred to in Sandwich’s letter. The
article noted the existence of numerous complaints against “Admiral
G____ , for not shewing a proper alacrity
They even go so far

151

as to accuse him with assisting the people of America and talk loudly
of Byng’s fate
12 Ira D. Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution
(New York, 1972), 22-23.
13 Sandwich had only privately advised Graves to take a more
vigorous, belligerent stance. Officially, Graves had received no spe
cific orders regarding a coastal expedition.
14 Narrative of Graves, 4 September 1775, in “Conduct,” II, 198.
15 Narrative of Graves, 6 October 1775, in Ibid., 248.
16 Graves to William Graves, I October 1775, quoted in Allen
French, “The Hallowell-Graves Fisticuffs, 1775,” (Massachusetts His
torical Society Proceedings, LXIII, 1931), 37.
17 The Essex Journal of 13 October 1775 reported that the Raven
had been in a violent storm, "which split her sails to pieces.’
18 Lords Commissioners of the British Admiralty to Graves, 6 July
1775, in Clark, William B., and William J. Morgan (eds.), Naval Docu
ments of the American Revolution. 6 vols. (Washington, U.S. Govt.
Printing Office, 1964—), I, 1316-17. Hereafter cited as ND AR.
19 Lord Dartmouth to Thomas Gage, 27 January 1775, in Clarence
E. Carter (ed.). The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage,
1763-1775. 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), II,
181-82; B.D. Barger. Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution.
(Columbia: L^niversity of South Carolina Press, 1965), 161, 165.
20 Graves to Stephens, 9 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 401.
21 Biography of Lieutenant Henry Mowat: Charles Edward Banks,
Scrapbook on Captain Henry Mowat, Maine Historical Society.
Mowat also had been stationed in the Portsmouth-Kittery area for
several months.
22 Graves in the “Conduct” listed the nine towns with a sentence or
two describing the particular offenses of each community. Narrative
of Graves, 6 October 1775, in “Conduct,” II, 250.
23 Graves to Henry Mowat, 6 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 324-25.
The quote on making the colonists feel British naval might is from
Sandwich to Graves, 22 August 1775, in Sandwich MSS, I, 232.
24 Graves to the Commanders of His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels in
North America, 6 October 1775, in Maine Historical Society (con
temporary copy, one page folio).
25 Graves to Stephens, 9 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 401.
26 This estimate is derived by interpolating from the lists of Graves’
squadron for the dates 16 June 1775 and 27 January 1776. On the for
mer date Graves had thirty vessels: thirteen ship-rigged (of third to

152

sixth rate), one brig, nine sloops and seven schooners. On 27 January
1776 Graves had a total of forty-one vessels: eighteen ship-rigged, two
brigs, fourteen sloops and seven schooners. Disposition of the North
American Squadron, 16 June 1775 and 27 January 1776, in Ibid., 236,
531.
27 Graves to Stephens, 9 October 1775, in Ibid., 401.
28 Narrative of Graves, 6 October 1775, in “Conduct,” II, 248.
29 Charles Edward Banks, Scrapbook containing Materials Pertain
ing to Captain Mowatt’s Destruction of Falmouth, October 18, 1775,
Maine Historical Society.
30 George Washington to John Hancock, 5 October 1775, and
George Washington to the President of the New York Provincial Con
gress, 13 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 301, 435.
31 Lieutenant Grant of the Royal Artillery consistently advanced in
rank throughout and after the War for American Independence, reach
ing the rank of Major General on 25 June 1810. Banks, Scrapbook on
Destruction of Falmouth. Maine Historical Society.
32 A carcass was fired from a howitzer and used to set buildings
and ships on fire. Flames issued through holes pierced in the sides.
Edgar K. Thompson, “Carcasses,” The Mariner's Mirror, LVI (No
vember 1970), 447.
33 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 443. A
contemporary copy of Mowat’s report is deposited at the Maine
Historical Society, Portland, Maine.
34 Based on the Canceauxs log, extracted from the Admiralty Pa
pers in Banks, Scrapbook on Destruction of Falmouth. The flotilla
was on a northeasterly run. The strong northwest winds were such
that these towns were undoubtedly too much to the windward. There
is absolutely no evidence to warrant the old tradition that Mowat
spared Portsmouth, New Hampshire, because he was in love with a
young woman who resided there. For a discussion of this tradition see
Banks, Scrapbook on Destruction of Falmouth.
35 Ibid.; Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, Adm. 1/485, 443.
36 Nathan Goold, “Falmouth Neck in the Revolution,” Collections
and Proceedings of the Maine Historical Society, 2d ser., VIII (1897),
72-73.
37 Joseph J. Malone, Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and
Forest Policy in Colonial New England, 1691-1775 (Seattle, 1964), 154.
38 William Hutchinson Rowe, The Maritime History of Maine (New
York, 1948), 55. Although Falmouth was a flourishing community and
served as an entrepot for Cumberland County, the town did not have
a bank or newspaper and had only benefited from the services of a

153

post office since May 1775. Goold, “Falmouth Neck in the Revolu
tion,” 72-73.
39 N. Goold, “Falmouth Neck in the Revolution,” 88.
40 W illiam Goold, Portland in the Past (Portland, Maine, 1886),
332-33.
41 N. Goold, “Falmouth Neck in the Revolution,” 88.
42 W. Goold, Portland in the Past, 335.
43 Reverend Smith’s Journals, 14 June 1774, 225. (see note 52 for
complete citation.)
44 William D. W illiamson, The History of the State of Maine (Hallo
well, Maine, 1832), II, 422.
45 Graves to Stephens, 4 March and 11 April 1775, in Adm. 1/485,
114-15, 128-29.
46 Minutes of the Falmouth Committee of Inspection, 2 March
1775, and Message to the Public from the Falmouth Committee of In
spection, 10 April 1775, in Peter Force (ed.), American Archives (4th
series; Washington, 1837-1853), II, 311-12.
47 Ibid., 311-313.
48 Message to the Public from the Falmouth Committee of Inspec
tion, 10 April 1775, in Ibid., 312.
49 Thomas Gage to Graves, 30 March 1775, in NDAR, I, 163.
50 Graves to Thomas Gage, 30 March 1775, in Ibid.
51 Henry Mowat to Graves, 4 May 1775, in Ibid., 277; Enoch Free
man to Samuel Freeman, 12 April 1775, in American Archives, II, 318.
52 Reverend Samuel Dean’s diary entry, 24 April 1775, in William
Willis (ed.), Journals of the Reverend Thomas Smith and the Rever
end Samuel Dean (Portland, Maine, 1849), 336.
53 Reverend Thomas Smith’s journal entry, 30 April 1775, in Ibid.,
227.
54 Falmouth Customs Officials to Boston Customs Commissioners,
29 April 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 147. The Boston officials relayed this
plea to Admiral Graves on 12 May. See Adm. 1/485, 146.
55 Petition of Falmouth loyalists, 2 May 1775, in Ibid., 144. The
group consisted of merchants, ship masters, customs officials, a physi
cian, a housewright, the sheriff and the Anglican minister.
56 Henry Mowat to Graves, 4 May 1775, in Ibid., 143; Jediah
Preble to Enoch Freeman, 14 May 1775, in William Lincoln (ed.), The
Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and
1775 (Boston, 18,38), 217. Hereafter cited as JEPCM.
57 Jediah Preble to Enoch Freeman, 14 May 1775, in JEPCM, 218n.

154

58 Journal of Reverend Wiswell, Maine Historical Society (tran
script), 5.
59 Letter from Falmouth to a W atertown Gentleman, 11 May 1775,
in American Archives, II, 552.
60 Ibid., 553.
61 Jediah Preble to Enoch Freeman, 14 May 1775, in JEPCM, 218.
62 Letter from Falmouth to a W atertown Gentleman, 11 Max’ 1775,
in American Archives, II, 553.
63 Ibid.
64 Jediah Preble to Enoch Freeman, 14 May 1775, in JEPCM,
218-19.
65 Letter from Falmouth to a Watertowm Gentleman, 11 May 1775,
in American Archives, II, 553-54.
6fi Ibid., 554-55.
67 Ibid., 555; W'iswell’s Journal, 5. For additional information regard
ing Thompson's War, see Charles Edward Banks, Scrapbook on
Thompson’s W ar in Falmouth, 1775, Maine Historical Society'.

6S Enoch Freeman to Massachusetts Committee of Safety', 10 May
1775, in JEPCM, 237n. Despite the Falmouth Committee’s claims, the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress concluded that “Thompson’s con
duct was friendly' to his country', and the cause of liberty
JEPCM, 402-03.

69 Narrative of Graves, 6 October 1775, in “Conduct," II, 250. For
more on Graves’ reaction to rebel activity in Falmouth during Thomp
son’s War, see the deposition of Philip Crandell, 1 January 1776, in
American Archives, III, 1170.
70 Charles Edward Banks, “The Destruction of Falmouth and the
Responsibility' Therefor, Collections and Proceedings of the Maine
Historical Society, 2nd ser., V (1894), 410-11; Graves to Stephens, 8
November 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 438-39.
71 Letter from Reverend Jacob Bailey, Collections of the Maine His
torical Society, 1st ser., V (1857), 442; Selectmen’s Account of the De
struction of the Too of Falmouth, in American Archives, III, 1171.
72 Narrative of Daniel Tucker, 17 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 488.
73 Henry' Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 443-44;
Bailey’s letter, 443.
74 Mowat’s ultimatum to the people of Falmouth, 16 October 1775,
in Adm. I/4S5. Mowat drafted the letter the day before it was de
livered.
75 Bailey'’s letter, 443. Reverend Bailey' had succeeded Reverend

155

Wiswell in the pastorate of Falmouth’s Anglican church. Wiswell, who
was kidnapped with Mowat during Thompson’s War, resigned his Fal
mouth pastorate and departed to Boston with Mowat in May. General
Gage then appointed him to the chaplaincy of a British regiment.
76 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 444-45;
Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1171. Coffin and
Pagan were loyalists and had signed the petition to Mowat on 2 May
requesting protection during Thompson’s War.
77 Report of the Preble, Coffin, Pagan committee to the people of
Falmouth, in American Archives, III, 1171; Henry Mowat to Graves,
19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 445.
78 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 445.
79 Preble, Cofffin, Pagan Report, in American Archives, III, 1171-72.
80 Bailey’s letter, 444.
81 Tucker’s Narrative in NDAR, II, 500.
82 Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172.
83 Bailey’s letter, 446.
81 Ibid., 447.
85 Preble, Coffin, Pagan Report, in American Archives, III, 1171-72.
86 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 445.
87 See Tucker’s Narrative, in NDAR, II, 500-01; Bailey’s letter,
446-47. Quite possibly, the town met as the committee stated, but de
cided that the committeemen inform Mowat that it had not met in an
effort to gain more time.
88 Preble, Coffin, Pagan Report, in American Archives, III, 1172;
Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 445-46.
89 Bailey’s letter, 447.
90 Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172.
91 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 445-46;
Canceaux’s log, 18 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 502. Tradition has it
that Widow Greele, owner of a popular Falmouth tavern, remained
on her property during the bombardment and extinguished several
fires, thereby saving her tavern. Supposedly, she removed a hot can
non ball that fell in her yard with a pair of tongs, remarking: “they
will have to stop firing soon for they have got out of bombs, and are
making new balls and can’t wait for them to cool.” John C. Warren,
“The Burning of Falmouth, 1775,” A History of Maine: A Collection
of Readings on the History of Maine, ed. Ronald F. Banks (rev. ed.,
Dubuque, Iowa, 1971), 118.
92 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 446;
Canceaux s log, 18 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 502.

156

93 Tucker’s Narrative, in NDAR, II, 501.
94 Reverend Bailey estimated that about one thousand "men in
arms witnessed the destruction. This figure, though probably in
flated, indicates that a considerable number of militia were present.
Bailey’s letter, 449.
95 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 446;
Bailey’s letter, 449.
96 Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172. Allen
French states that Captain Noyes, commander of a company of
Massachusetts 'sea coast’ troops, received conflicting directives from
the individual members of a Falmouth committee responsible for or
dering his force. The confused Noyes consequently did relatively no
thing to defend the town. French, First Year of the Revolution, 542.
See Jediah Preble’s condemnation of the behavior of both the militia
and the provincial troops in Banks, Scrapbook on Destruction of Fal
mouth.
97 Jediah Preble’s Account, in Banks, Scrapbook on Destruction of
Falmouth; Tucker’s Narrative, in NDAR, II, 501.
98 Bailey’s letter, 447-48.
99 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 446.
100 Williamson, History of Maine, II, 438.
101 Canceaux’s log, 18 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 502.
102 Anonymous letter on the Destruction of Falmouth, 16 February
1776, in Maine Historical Society, MSS Scrapbook, I, 54.
103 Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172; Henry
Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 447. See also
Bailey’s letter, 449; Tucker’s Narrative, in NDAR, II, 501; Reverend
Smith*s Journals, 18 October 1775, 230.
104 Bailey’s letter, 449; Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives,
III, 1172.
105 Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172; Henry
Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 444. Mowat stated
that he captured four vessels.
106 Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172.
107 Anonymous letter, in Maine Historical Society. MSS Scrapbook,
I, 54.
108 Bailey’s letter, 449. Bailey’s accusation was no doubt an exaggera
tion. The Falmouth town officials, who had been most vocal in their
protests against less objectionable behavior during Thompson’s War,
made no mention of such pilfering.
109 James Phinney Baxter (ed.), Documentary History of the State

157

of Maine, XIV (Portland, Maine, 1910), 310. Hereafter cited as Baxter
MSS.
110 Bailey’s letter, 450.
111 Anonymous letter, Maine Historical Society. MSS Scrapbook, I,
54.
112 Samuel Deane to Benjamin Greenleaf, 4 November 1775, in
NDAR, II, 878.
113 General Nathaniel Green to Governor Cooke, 24 October 1775,
in American Archives, III, 1168.
114 Ibid., Selectmen’s Account, in American Archives, III, 1172;
Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 447.
115 Reuben Fogg (militia colonel from Scarborough, Maine) to
George Washington, 20 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 535-36.
116 Jeremiah Powell to Massachusetts House of Representatives, 24
October 1775, in Baxter MSS, XIV, 319-20.
117 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Adm. 1/485, 447.
118 Graves to Stephens, 8 November 1775, in Ibid., 438-39.
119 Henry Mowat to Graves, 19 October 1775, in Ibid., 443-47.
120 Graves to Stephens, 8 November 1775, in Ibid., 438-39.
121 Not surprisingly, the affair received closer attention in the pa
pers of coastal New England towns, which feared a similar visitation
from the Royal Navy. See especially the Essex Journal and the New
England Chronicle.
122 New England Chronicle, 19 October 1775. Though dated 19
October, this account must have been written a few days later, since
it mentions events that occurred in Portsmouth, Salem and Newbury
port on or after 20 October. The same article appeared in the follow
ing papers: The Massachusetts Spy, 27 October 1775; Boston Gazette,
30 October 1775; Connecticut Courant, 30 October 1775.
123 Mowat’s communication in the following: New England Chron
icle, 26 October 1775; Massachusetts Spy, 10 November 1775;
Connecticut Courant, 6 November 1775; Providence Gazette, 4 No
vember 1775; Rivington s New York Gazette, 9 November 1775; New
York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, 6 November 1775; Virginia Ga
zette (Dixon and Hunter printers), 18 November 1775. The Jones ac
count appeared in the following: Providence Gazette, 4 November
1775; Rivington s New York Gazette, 2 November 1775; Virginia
Gazette (Pinkney printer), 9 and 16 November 1775.
124 George Washington to John Hancock, 24 October 1775, in
NDAR, II, 501. See also George Washington to General Philip Schuy
ler, 26 October 1775, in NDAR, II, 668.

158

125 George Washington to William Ramsay, 12 November 1775, in
Ibid., 998.
126 Nathaniel Green to Nicholas Cooke, 24 October 1775, in Ibid.,
595. See also Nathaniel Green to Governor W ard, 23 October 1775, in
American Archives, III, 1145.
127 James Warren to John Adams, 22 October 1775, in NDAR, II,
569.
128 Josiah Quincy to John Adams, 25 October 1775, in Ibid., 603.
129 William Tudor to John Adams, 25 October 1775, in Ibid., 601.
130 William Gordon to John Adams, 25 October 1775, in Ibid., 603.
Abigail Adams’ correspondence with her husband, also written on 25
October, viewed the Falmouth affair in a different light. Abigail la
mented over Falmouth’s fate and searched her soul for reasons why
God would permit such an “Evil to befall
[this] city.” She
mused that the town’s destruction might have been a punishment for
some corporate colonial ‘sin,’ perhaps slavery. Abigail Adams to John
Adams, 25 October 1775, in L.H. Butterfield, W’endell D. Garret, and
Marjorie E. Sprague (eds.), The Adams Family Correspondence
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), I, 313.
131 Elizabeth Smith to Reverend Isaac Smith, Jr., 28 October 1775,
in Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings LIX (December
1927), 132.

132 A Newport, Rhode Island man’s diary7 entry for 26 October was
typical of such reaction. He wrote that news of the Falmouth affair
exited "a new & desponding Alarm through this Town lest it shd. be
also fired.” Diary entry of Dr. Ezra Stiles, 26 October 1775, in NDAR,
II, 611.
B3 Minutes of the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, 23 Octo
ber 1775, in Ibid., 575; General John Sullivan to George W ashington,
29 October 1775; in Otis G. Hammond (ed.), Letters and Papers of
Major-General John Sullivan (Concord, New Hampshire, 1930), I,
118; Journal of Jeremy Belknap, 24 October 1775, in Banks, Scrap
book on Destruction of Falmouth.

134 See George Washington to John Sullivan, 7 November 1775, in
NDAR, II, 913.
135 Massachusetts Spy, 3 November 1775.
136 James Duncan Phillips, Salem in the Eighteenth Century (Boston,
1937), 370.
137 Phillip Callbeck to Vice Admiral Molyneux Shuldham (Graves’
successor), 10 January 1776, in NDAR, III, 711.
138 Hutchinson’s Diary, 18 December 1775 in Peter O. Hutchinson

159

(ed.), The Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson. 2 vols. (London:
Sampson Low, 1883-86), I, 583.
139 Gentleman s Magazine, December 1775, XLV, 598.
140 See County de Vergennes to Count de Guines, 31 December
1775, in NDAR, III, 468. Of the two English accounts the thesis writer
used one was a reprint of Pearson Jones’ account (Gentlemans Maga
zine, December 1775) and the other was a narrative of the affair,
which viewed Thompson’s War as the cause of Falmouth’s destruc
tion (Annual Register, 1776, 34-35).
141 Lords Commissioners of the British Admiralty to Lord George
Germain, 3 January 1776, in NDAR, III, 471.
142 Hutchinson s Diary, 19 December 1775, I, 583.
143 William Howe to George Germain, 7 May 1776, in NDAR, IV,
1436; Gerald Saxon Brown, The American Secretary: The Colonial
Policy of Lord George Germain, 1775-1778 (Ann Arbor, 1963), 76. Ger
main did not pursue the matter further.
144 See NDAR, II, 669-70.
145 Count de Guines to Count de Vergennes, 22 December 1775,
in Ibid., Ill, 443.
146 Count de Vergennes to Count de Guines, 31 December 1775, in
Ibid., 468.
147 William Willis, The History of Portland: From 1632 to 1864 (2nd
ed.; Portland, Maine, 1865), 549-50; N. Goold, “Falmouth in the
Revolution,” 43.
148 Reverend Samuel Deane to Benjamin Greenleaf, 4 November
1775, in NDAR, II, 877-78; Memorial of the Committee of Falmouth,
1 November 1775, in NDAR, II, 851-52.
149 William Whipple to John Langdon, 12 November 1775, in
NDAR, II, 947.
150 New England Chronicle, 23 November 1775. For other com
ments on the relationship between the Falmouth affair and the desire
for independence, see the remarks of George Washington, 31 January
1776, quoted in James Thomas Flexner, George Washington in the
American Revolution (Boston, 1967), 68; a Philadelphia merchant to
Robert Herries, 15 February 1776, in Stopford-Sackville MSS, II, 21.

160

Lieutenant Henry Mowat 1734-1789

The map appearing in the centerfold is reproduced from The History of Portland by William
Willis. For the likeness of Henry Mowat above, we are indebted to the U.S. Office of Naval
History. It appears in the first volume of their Naval Documents of the American Revolution.

